St. John's Law Review
Volume 26, December 1951, Number 1

Article 9

Civil Rights--Right of Privacy (Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 106
N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1951))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
CIVI

RIGHTS-RIGHT OF PRivAcY.--The plaintiff sued for dam-

ages alleging that defendants used his name and picture in violation
of Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law. 1 Plaintiff, a showman and
producer of trained animal acts, performed between the halves of a
professional football game, pursuant to a contract with the owner of
the home team. The defendant broadcasting company, despite prior
formal objections, included the act in the telecast. Commercial announcements were made before and after the act. Plaintiff's name
was used in the accompanying dialogue which was merely descriptive and reportorial. Held, judgment for plaintiff reversed. The use
of plaintiff's name and picture was not a use "for advertising purposes" nor "for the purposes of trade" within the meaning of the
statute. Section 51 was not intended to protect the value of one's
act but only to guard against injury to one's personality through an
unlawful invasion of the limited right of privacy. Gautier v. ProFootball,Inc., 106 N. Y. S. 2d 553 (1st Dep't 1951).
The lower court made the observation that the use of a television camera rather than an ordinary camera for the projection of
plaintiff's image was immaterial.2 It appears evident that pictures
taken and used in connection with newspaper or newsreel coverage
of the game, and events incidental thereto, would not constitute violations of Section 51. 3 It is submitted that, in treating the lack of
exploitation in the commercial announcements analogously to a newspaper article placed entirely apart from any advertisement, the holding may well reach a proper result. The fact that the physical segregation is measured by time rather than space should not, it may be
argued with some force, be the basis of distinction. Treating the
telecast of a public event similarly to newspaper coverage, and applying the principles applicable thereto, may provide reasonably adequate
solutions to problems created by this new medium.
I N. Y. CIVILI
GrTs Acr § 51. "Any person whose name, portrait or
picture is used... for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained... may maintain an equitable action...
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture,
to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages
"
injuries sustained by reason of such use ....
for any
2
See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 198 Misc. 850, 852, 99 N. Y. S. 2d
812, 814 (N. Y. City Ct. 1950).
a Cf. Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 56, 103 N. E. 1108, 1110 (1913)
(newspaper) ; Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 473,
178 N. Y. Supp. 752, 756 (1st Dep't 1919) (newspaper and newsreel).
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It may be argued that although the actual methods of factual
dissemination differ, the motivating forces and economic factors influencing both media are quite similar. Newspaper publishers present
items of general interest to maintain circulation and thereby attract
advertisers who provide income. 4 Similarly television presentations
are the result of a desire to achieve "ratings" conducive to the attraction of sponsors. Considerations of this sort would tend to support the view that telecasters should have privileges equal to those
afforded newspaper publishers. In neither field should the statute
prohibit the use of material which is of legitimate public or general
interest. 5 It must be borne in mind; however, that television is a new
product of our mechanical age, one whose ramifications are as yet
little understood, and for that reason it may be dangerous to analogize
its problems too much to those of other media.
The fact that this new medium possesses the capacity for instantaneous transmission, magnifies its importance as a news source. The
courts have demonstrated a reluctance to pass judgment on the content of the news.6 It would seem that this reluctance should vary inversely with the possibility of abuse,7 and since television dialogue
may not deviate markedly from the activity being transmitted, the
abuse of the reportorial function is even less likely than with other
media.
It has been indicated that the players or spectators at public
events would not be protected by the statute.8 Argument may therefore be made that since the individuals in attendance have surrendered
their right of privacy because of the public nature of such assemblies,
a professional performer, who has coveted the limelight similarly may
not seek protection of his privacy from invasion.9
There has been judicial indication that despite the fact the statute
is penal in part, it should be liberally construed.' 0 However, the
4 "All publications presumably are operated for profit and articles contained therein are used with a view to increasing circulation." Serge Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 483, 68 N. Y. S. 2d
779, 783 (Sup. Ct.), affd iner., 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 432 (1st

Dep't 1947).

5 See Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 474, 178
N. Y. Supp. 752, 757 (1st Dep't 1919) (newsreel and newspaper) ; Sarat Lahiri
v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 782, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382, 389 (Sup. Ct.
1937) (newspaper) ; Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570,
571, 124 N. Y. Supp. 780, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (newspaper).
6Cf. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 474, 178
N. Y. Supp. 752, 757 (1st Dep't 1919).
7

"The public policy involved in leaving unhampered the channels for

the circulation of news and information is considered of primary importance,
subject always, of course, to the common-law right of redress for libel." Sarat
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 781, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382, 388

(Sup. Ct. 1937).

8 Cf. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 473, 178
N. Y.
Supp. 752, 756 (1st Dep't 1919).
9
See Note, 15 Mo. L. Rav. 48 (1950).
10 Jackson v. Consuimer Publications, Inc., 169 Misc. 1022, 10 N. Y. S. 2d
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courts, perhaps influenced by the fact that a common law right of
privacy was denied in New York," have been loath to extend a remedy to any situation other than those which fall within the confines
of the statute. 1 2 The decision in the instant case is another indication of that tendency towards restrained judicial interpretation of the
statute.

CONFLICT OF LAws-DomEsTIc RELATIONS-JURISDICTION TO
AWARD CUSTODY WHERE CHILD IS TEMPORARILY OUTSIDE STATE.-

Plaintiff and defendant were domiciled in Ohio. As a result of in
personam proceedings instituted in that state, plaintiff was awarded
temporary custody of her minor child, ancillary to a final decree of
divorce. The child had been sporadically cared for by the paternal
great-grandfather in Pennsylvania, and was in fact sent there four
days before the divorce action. The Ohio decree provided that the
child continue his residence in Pennsylvania, but expressly reserved
jurisdiction to subsequently relitigate the issue of custody. Six
months later the plaintiff was awarded exclusive custody of the child
by the Ohio court. Prior thereto, the defendant had taken up residence with his child in Pennsylvania where the plaintiff now institutes habeas corpus proceedings. The trial court refused to grant
custody to the plaintiff in the interest of the child's welfare. The
Superior Court reversed, holding that the Ohio decree was entitled
to full faith and credit. Held, judgment reversed. The decree of
the Ohio court need not be accorded full faith and credit since the
foreign court had no jurisdiction over the child, who was residing in
Pennsylvania at the time the decree was awarded. Commonwealth
ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 80 A. 2d 829 (Pa. 1951).
There has developed a sharp divergence of judicial opinion concerning the jurisdictional requirements necessary to empower a court
to award custody of minor children. Some courts have designated
residence of the child within the state as the criterion.' It is rea691 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295
N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
"1Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442

(1902).

12 Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913); Humiston
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (Ist
Dep't 1919); Wallach v. Bacharach, 192 Misc. 979, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 37 (Sup.
Ct.), affd inem., 274 App. Div. 919, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 894 (1st Dep't 1948);
Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Swacker
v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N. Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Jeffries v.
N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y. Supp. 780 (Sup.
Ct. 1910).
I Thrift v. Thrift, 54 Mont. 463, 171 Pac. 272 (1918) ; Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925); Ritchison v. Ritchison, 28 Tenn. App.
432, 191 S. W. 2d 188 (1946).

